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Abstract: Critics of participation often examine the undesirable consequences of state-led systems
without much analysis of institutional knowledge at the local level. In this paper, we investigate
whether smaller institutions could oer useful knowledge for meeting the development needs
of local people. Using participation theory and related literature on development and power,
we investigate a co-management system in communities around Mount Cameroon National Park
(MCNP), in sub-Saharan West Africa. Our study adopts a multimethod approach to survey ocials in
16 agencies and locals in 17 village groups. The findings indicate factors that hinder the eectiveness
of local participation and avenues by which institutional knowledge can be customized to meet local
development priorities. This system of participation, we conclude, could work better through open
dialogue that is explicitly accountable and transparent.
Keywords: co-management; institutional knowledge; sustainability; paradox; community
participation; development and power; Mount Cameroon National Park; Sub-Saharan West Africa
1. Introduction
In the past few decades, community participation has become an important concept in advocating
for the needs of local people, i.e., individuals who exist in and belong to an area where they live
permanently, when making decisions for the collaborative management of natural resources. Here,
“community” refers to a local unit of social organization that retains an important role in society despite
its reliance upon larger units [1]. In community research, scholars use the concepts of ‘community’ and
‘participation’ to identify processes for engaging actors to undertake responsible roles in society [2].
These processes could include groups representing a large number of persons [3], as well as democratic
measures that engage citizens [4,5]. Considering that participation should enable local communities and
stakeholders to work together in planning for the sustainable management of natural resources [6,7],
applying participatory processes in local communities has met with significant challenges over the last
two decades. In this paper, we use examples from Cameroon to examine why a co-management system
involves diculties pertaining to participation and ask whether we can build on the knowledge of
institutions that exist within this system.
We consider the period between the 1940s and 1980s, when colonial and postcolonial regimes had
protectionist approaches to conservation in Africa that, over time, faced opposition due to the negative
consequences on local communities [8]. Cameroon, for example, following its commitment to structural
adjustment programs (SAP) in the 1980s, began rationalizing its forestry and agricultural sectors to
promote the sustainable development of natural resources and economic growth [9]. This became
a drive for regulating protected areas in Cameroon by involving local communities. Some of these
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protected areas, such as the Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP), have been for many generations
a source of livelihood for people living in and around forested areas. See the example of the Bakweri
and the land problem [10]: A group that currently resides at the fringes of MCNP following a history
of land displacement. Such areas face challenges with getting people to work together in making
decisions about land use. In the subsequent parts of this paper, we revisit this paradox through the
lens of a co-managed (collaborative management) system among MCNP communities.
The above critique of participation is not new. In 1981, some of the world-leading conservation
agencies, like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), ratified the World Conservation Strategy to sustain
ecosystems through the active involvement of local people [11]. Despite this agreement, there are
significant problems in communities that rely on natural resources for a living [9,12–14]. For the most
part, local communities, in spite of their engagement in development programs, have experienced
a reduction in their ability to influence decisions in participatory systems [12]. This is partly due to
bureaucratically determined management regulations that detach people from culturally valuable
natural resources in the pursuit of increasing income per capita, wage labor, agricultural productivity,
and marketization [13–15]. Failure to address such bureaucracy in the establishment of management
regulations means there is little space for recognizing local input in decision-making.
Regarding the unintended outcomes of participation, critical studies in recent decades have
analyzed participation from the perspectives of development [3,16] and power [17–19]. Hickey
and Mohan [3], for instance, studied how participatory development, a practice that should engage
marginalized groups with issues of power, technically failed by depoliticizing what should be politically
explicit, as can be seen in state-led participatory development. Furthermore, the sharing of power
between institutions and local people determines the relationship between actors in the system of
participation. Here, the critical basis for power includes ‘spaces’ for community participation spatially
bounded in ways that define ‘empowerment’ according to the institution’s own making. In eect,
this deviates from the perceptions that local people have about empowerment and subjects them
to power structures that they are unable to question [19]. See the example of a REDD+ (reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) initiative in Tanzania where local participation was
reinforced by structures that led to power dierentials between actors [18]. The colonial appropriation
of urban wetlands in Colombo, Sri Lanka, also depicts this power imbalance [20].
Critics of participation and related practices have broadly focused on the radical politics of
development and power, where inequalities of participation exist within communities [3,12–14,16,18,19].
This scholarship, however, does not give much attention to the way in which institutional action
at local levels of society can be used to promote local knowledge in decisions within participatory
systems. Some studies, though, suggest the potential of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
assist communities based on gaining the trust of local people and mobilizing financial and political
resources [21,22]. Moreover, scholars have argued that the extent of the work of smaller conservation
NGOs is not entirely known in the development sector [23]. They further propose that understanding
how participation occurs in various structures of power and political systems will bring about new
ideas for establishing transformative approaches of participation [3].
To advance the above lines of thinking, we need to understand the institutional capacity for action
that could give communities a voice in participatory systems. Consistent with the views of Hosli
and Dörfler [24], we define an institution’s capacity to act as a process that necessitates abstracting
from the preferences of local people and adapting such preferences to accountable structures of power.
Doing so requires an assessment of smaller institutions, their role in participatory systems, and the
opinions that local people have about collaborating with such institutions. In this study, we define
smaller institutions as those units operating at local levels of society. Meanwhile, ‘knowledge’ is a
dynamic concept with several definitions; however, in participatory development, it is defined as
knowledge that is culturally and ecologically situated, shared, geared to real-life practices, and acquired
to respond to social and natural environments that are constantly changing [25]. Using the example of
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a co-management system for MCNP, this paper aims: (a) to identify the legal basis for institutional
and local participation, (b) to determine the paradox of the system and the concerns that local people
have about participating in the system, and (c) to suggest how institutions can better acknowledge
the development needs of local people in co-management. The conclusions of this study suggest that
augmenting local participation in co-management can be possible if grounded upon a nuanced analysis
and identification of institutional knowledge for action that can favorably respond to the development
needs of local people.
2. Developments towards Participation in Cameroon
The participatory system of co-management in Cameroon cannot be examined without a
review of neoliberal developments, i.e., state-led processes that prioritize systems of competition,
price mechanisms, and free enterprise, in the postcolonial history of Cameroon and the subsequent
legal frameworks introduced preceding the creation of MCNP. Shortly after Cameroon’s independence
in 1960, the country had budgetary deficits due to a drop in oil and petroleum prices. This led to a
decline in the export trade [9] (p. 39). In the late 1980s, growing foreign indebtedness compelled the
Cameroonian government to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank under structural adjustment programs (SAP). These programs consisted of reforms for economic
recovery, between 1988 and 1994, including measures to restructure the forest and agricultural sectors
of Cameroon. For the forest sector, in 1993, the World Bank recommended the rationalization of forests
in grassroots communities towards the sustainable management of natural resources. Thereafter,
the government ratified a state forestry and wildlife law in 1994, as a commitment to SAP [9] (p. 94).
This law created permanent forests (forested areas that are by law excluded from other use than for
forestry) on 30% of the country’s territory. These forests were equally multipurposed for protected
areas, timber exploitation, farming, and pasture. The implementation of this law meant participation
with local people who rely on such forests, considering that many communities are located in areas
used by timber operators.
For the agricultural sector, participatory schemes for the sustainable management of natural
resources led to internalized neoliberal norms among locals as such schemes were aimed at providing
communities with alternative means of livelihoods. In the 1990s, the government introduced two SAP
initiatives. These included Financing and Investment in Agriculture and Community Micro-projects
(FIMAC) and the Programme National de Vulgarisation et de Recherche Agricoles (PNVRA). While FIMAC
targeted the promotion of rural participation in socioeconomic development, PNVRA aimed at raising
agricultural productivity and improved access to technology among farming communities [9]; [26]
(pp. 213–215). Through these initiatives, local organizations received loans for community development
projects in all 10 regions of Cameroon. Consequently, when SAP liberalized reforms for cocoa in the
1990s, it led to the extension of land for cultivating crops. Furthermore, this mode of participation incited
counterproductive conditions in rural communities [27] (p.18). In other words, while loan schemes
for participatory development oered technological advancements to boost agricultural production
among locals, it became dicult to transport farm produce due to insucient infrastructure.
2.1. Study Area and Political Organization
Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP) is located in the southwest of Cameroon at latitude
4130 N and longitude 9100 E. There are 41 villages around MCNP, with the population estimated at
100,000 (Figure 1). MCNP has a surface area of 58,178 hectares (ha), comprising four cluster zones:
Buea cluster (20,553.83 ha) southeast of MCNP, Muyuka cluster (6291.73 ha) to the east, Bomboko
cluster (12,963.43 ha) in the northwest, and the West Coast cluster (18,369.03 ha) on the western side of
MCNP. Volcanic soil and annual precipitation rates of up to 10,000 mm on the western slopes of MCNP
influence the rich biodiversity.
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Figure 1. MCNP and surrounding communities. Authors’ field data, adapted from the MCNP 
Service (2017). 
Figure 1. MCNP and surrounding communities. Authors’ field data, adapted from the MCNP
Service (2017).
In terms of human settlement, the Bakweri is one of the most known early settler groups
in the Mount Cameroon area. For many generations, they have relied on the forest for hunting,
trapping, and gathering forest products. Nowadays, a heterogeneous population structure exists with
20th-century migrants from other regions of Cameroon, including the Bali, Wum, Kom, and Essimbi,
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among other groups. The rainy season lasts from March to October, and the dry season from November
to February.
For this reason, locals cultivate crops such as potatoes, cassava, plantains, and cocoyams for
household and commercial purposes. Cocoa is a common cash crop cultivated in Bomboko and
Muyuka with the support of participatory development schemes, and accounts for approximately
50% of agricultural income. The locals benefit from other activities like animal trapping, harvesting
timber, and wild honey. Tree species like bamboo, mahogany, White Afara, and Iroko are visible in all
cluster zones of MCNP. Although Christianity is becoming the dominant religion in MCNP villages,
traditional beliefs endure through practices of worshiping deities and ancestral spirits as guardians of
the land. These activities are reflected in the socioeconomic characteristics of the study communities
(Table 1).
Table 1. Socioeconomic characteristics of the study communities. Authors’ field data adapted from
agro-socio-ecological assessment (ASEA) reports 2012–2015 of the MCNP Service (2017).
MCNP
Cluster Zone
Village
Community Population Economic Activities Dependence on Forest
Buea Bonakanda 1000–1500 Farming of cocoyams, plantains, potatoes, andcassava
Timber harvesting, Bee
keeping, and animal trapping
West Coast
Lower
Boando 500
Fishing and the sale of fish
Palm nut farming, harvesting, and sales
Extraction and sale of oil palm
Timber and bamboo
harvesting
Bee keeping
Batoke >2000
Bakingili >2000
Njonje <1000
Bibunde >2000
Sanje 500–1000
Muyuka Lykoko >2000 Fuel wood sales; rearing goats, fowls, and pigs
The sale of honey
Timber and bamboo
harvesting, bee keepingMunyenge >2000
Bomboko
Bomana 1000–1500
Cocoa cultivation and sales; farming corn,
cocoyam, plantains, and cassava
Rearing cows and goats
Animal trapping, timber
harvesting
Harvesting of medicinal plants
The use of caves for spiritual
needs
Big Koto I 1000–1500
Efolofo 500–1000
Kuke Kumbo 1000–1500
Munyange 500–1000
Mundongo 500–1000
Bova
Bomboko >2000
Boviongo 500
In terms of the political organizational structure, areas that would come to be on the periphery
of MCNP following Cameroon’s independence in 1960, and an integral part of participation in
co-management, include the subdivisional areas of Buea, Limbe, Idenau, Muyuka, and Mbonge,
in the southwest of Cameroon. A governor administers these areas regionally. Under the governor,
the territory is governed by three levels of administration:
 Subdivisional councils led by mayors corresponding to all five subareas.
 Within the subdivisions are villages led by chiefs who are responsible for dispute settlement,
organizing traditional ceremonies, and codifying customary law.
 The MCNP Service leads the development and co-management of MCNP, including adjacent
villages, in collaboration with partner organizations.
2.2. Legalities for Institutional Participation in Communities
Participation between adjacent communities and institutions in the co-management of MCNP is
formalized by two major legalities.
 Laws for the participation of local communities and co-management institutions (subdivisional
councils, NGOs, and state organs).
 The 2014 co-management plan for MCNP and the participation of locals and partner agencies.
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Section 72 of Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994 approves the participation of indigenous peoples in
environmental management through free access to environmental information and involvement in the
use of land resources. It, however, lacks a decree for the full respect of customary rights. In Cameroon,
the term ‘indigenous peoples’ is used to describe groups with a distinctive culture and connection to
ancestral lands. It is also subjective and contested as to whether and how a group identifies itself by a
common ancestor and place of heritage. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF), a unit of
the government, ensures this means of indigenous involvement. Article 8 of section 1 of the 1994 state
forestry law entitles every inhabitant of a forest zone to usage rights. While this law excludes protected
animal species from usage rights, it allows locals to gather nontimber forest products for personal
use, while prohibiting any commercial use. However, the law permits locals to access community
forests outside of MCNP boundaries for agriculture, livestock farming, and the hunting of unprotected
animals specified by the 1994 state law [28].
Law No. 99/014 of 22 December 1999 and Law No. 90/053 of 19 December 1990 legalize the
participation of NGOs and state organizations in activities of environmental protection [28]. For instance,
between 1994 and 2003, an initiative (Mount Cameroon Project) by the Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Cameroon government helped locals generate revenue from forest
resources (such as wild honey and Prunus africana) other than protected species, while maintaining
the ecological value of the forest [29]. In 2004, the Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune (MINFOF) and
the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) replaced MINEF. The government
placed activities related to the management of national parks in Cameroon under the responsibility of
MINFOF’s department for wildlife and protected areas. By 2009, the Cameroon government introduced
development plans known as Cameroon Vision 2035 and 2009 Growth and Employment Strategy Paper
2010-2020 that called for the commitment of government agencies, NGOs, and local communities,
to protect and ensure the sustainable management of forest ecosystems [30]. To attain these visions,
MINEP implements REDD+ initiatives in communities around Mount Cameroon.
The participation of subdivisional councils in MCNP villages was legalized by the 1996 and
2004 Cameroon laws on decentralization. These laws approved the transfer of central powers to
local entities, assigned in areas of interest including health care, education, culture, and economic
development. Specifically, Law No. 2004/017 of July 22 on the orientation of decentralization and
Law No. 2004/018 of July 22, laying down rules applicable to councils, outline the above visions [31].
In 2005, the government of Cameroon created a National Program for Participatory Development
(PNDP) under the Ministère de l’Economie, de la Planification et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (MINEPAT).
This institution assists the state by helping subdivisional councils apply decentralized financing of
projects for community development in rural areas of Cameroon [32].
2.3. Co-Management Framework
The Cameroon government created MCNP in 2009 to promote the conservation of biodiversity and
the sustainable management of natural resources. To ensure the inclusion of local people in this process,
Ministerial decision No. 0385/MINFOF/SG/DFAP of 12 August 2014 established a co-management
plan that formalized the participation between the MCNP Service, partner institutions, and locals in
peripheral villages. This plan, in particular, made it legal for stakeholders from divisional, subdivisional,
regional, and national levels of society to be involved in the co-management of MCNP. Moreover,
it convened a technical committee for elaborating management plans developed to last from 2015 to 2019,
renewable after assessments of the plan. Implementing co-management in communities comes with
the active role of functional units of the MCNP Service, an agency led by a conservator who coordinates
park planning and management. These units include finance and administration, production unit,
collaborative management unit, research and monitoring, and ecotourism development. By means of a
program for sustainable management of natural resources in the southwest region, co-management is
funded partly by the Cameroonian government via the Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune (MINFOF),
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as well as by the German government’s development bank (KfW), with technical support from the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) [33].
Although this plan aims at serving ecosystems and local communities, it raises concerns about
‘fairness’ in local participation for several reasons. For example, it comprises an imported development
model, arranged by six management programs (sustainable finance mechanism, park protection,
and surveillance, administration and finance, ecotourism development, research and monitoring,
and collaborative management and local development) that facilitate government objectives in
co-management. Furthermore, this model of participation merely endorses local involvement if the
interests of local people correlate with the conditions outlined in four pillars that uphold the state’s
vision of co-management [33] (p. 31). These include:
Pillar 1 on ‘community mobilization and participation’ of the co-management plan, created cluster
conservation zones, village forest management committees (VFMC), cluster platforms, and cluster
facilitators. Within these structures, locals participate in capacity building, sensitization, elaboration,
and implementation of co-management activities according to state laws. Through this pillar, partner
institutions such as NGOs and state organs from various levels of the society help the MCNP
Service to promote local participation in projects for both development and environmental protection.
Local people also gain membership in VFMCs and carry out joint patrols in the MCNP alongside
park authorities; they also meet every six months to discuss, validate, and implement new ideas for
conservation and community development. Here, sensitization requires that locals gain knowledge of
forestry reforms and the sustainable management of resources in order to participate better within
the co-management model, but makes little recognition of the traditional context in which locals can
manage forest resources.
Pillar 2 on ‘implementation of a system of conservation incentives’ infers a paternalist notion
of participation that self-perpetuates the paradox of co-management. It ushers in conservation
bonuses (CB) and conservation credits (CC). A CB is an incentive issued to locals based on local
adherence to conservation development agreements (CDA) in co-management. A CC is a fixed
incentive amounting to about 200,000 CFA francs (304.90 euros) annually per village, and determined
in accordance with locals’ compliance to state forestry laws. For the regime to reinforce its vision of
co-management, it organizes monitoring and assessment activities every six months with the aid of
agro-socio-ecological assessment (ASEA) reports. ASEA reports are presented during joint sessions
between village representatives and park authorities. When locals trespass illegally into the MCNP,
or hurt wildlife, such acts are recorded in books accessible to both park authorities and concerned locals
during cluster platform meetings. Meetings are crucial for making decisions on what communities
qualify for financial support of conservation incentives. Consequently, according to the 1994 forestry
and wildlife state law, state ocials can penalize individuals arrested in illegal activities like poaching
through exorbitant fines and lengthy imprisonment.
Pillar 3, on ‘immediate park management,’ further indicates that paradox in co-management.
Here, locals join park ocials in activities of surveillance and patrol in the MCNP and gain training
skills to perform as tour guides and porters in ecotourism. The locals participate as harvesters in
community-based management of Prunus africana, a medicinal plant used in the treatment of cancer
and grown for commercial use (see also [34]). While members of the VFMC join park authorities to
patrol and arrest poachers on MCNP, pillar 3 does not specify the customary rights for which local
people can continue to use the park.
Pillar 4, on the elaboration and implementation of conservation development agreements (CDA),
involves another paradox. CDA is a state-determined platform to elaborate on projects of infrastructural
development and income-generating activities. Ironically, for locals to benefit from such projects,
their needs must correlate with visions of the CDA. Practically, CDA prioritizes local development
needs, based on how well local people adhere to state forestry laws and co-management objectives. In
other words, the degree to which local communities can benefit from state assistance with development
greatly depends on how well the locals comply with the regulations of the state.
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The above review of the literature [29,30,32,33,35] shows the legalities that guide the participation
of institutions and local people in co-management. It also indicates that, although co-management
aims at sharing roles fairly between dierent actors towards achieving certain goals, the system
contradicts this notion because the ‘modeling’ of participation gives little space for locals to influence
such modeling. Critics of participation [3,12–14,16,18,19] share similar views. They, however, do not
give much attention to the possibilities for which institutional action and expertise at local levels
of society could be used to facilitate local needs in participatory systems. The subsequent parts of
this paper evaluate the concerns of local people about development and the opinions of institutional
authorities regarding eective participation.
3. Materials and Methods
This study used a multimethod approach combining a review of literature, purposive sampling,
a focus group study comprising 17 groups with 270 participants, and face-to-face interviews among
16 ocials. We collected data between August and December 2017, following authorization from
Cameroon’s Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, the leading state body overseeing protected areas
in Cameroon. In the case of the Mount Cameroon communities, the MCNP Service has the major
responsibility for implementing co-management objectives by collaborating with local people in villages
adjacent to the park. However, consistent with the stipulations of pillar 2 in the 2014 co-management
plan [33] (p. 31), partner institutions such as state organs and NGOs within Cameroon and elsewhere,
as well as subdivisional councils in the five subdivisions of Cameroon’s southwest region, have a duty
to facilitate co-management when called upon, in agreement with the MCNP Service.
During sta meetings at the MCNP oce in Buea, we brainstormed on possible partner institutions
in the southwest. Considering the vast number of institutions that collaborate with the MCNP Service,
and the unavailability of persons for interviews, we utilized expert sampling—a form of purposive
sampling whereby the researcher focuses on experts in a particular field of interest. In doing so,
the researcher makes a deliberate choice by selecting several participants who are willing to provide
information [36]. We focused on three criteria for this interview selection.
 Subdivisional councils, NGOs, and state organs actively involved in facilitating co-management
and whose head oces are permanently stationed in the southwest region of Cameroon.
 Selecting ocials in each institution, whose duties pertain to co-management at community levels
of society.
 Experts who provided their informed consent and acceptance for interviews following phone
calls and visits to oces.
This enabled us to conduct face-to-face interviews of 45–50 min. According to [37], face-to-face
interviews enable the researcher to observe facial expressions and body language—extra information
on which the researcher can reflect. In doing so, we used semi-structured questions focusing on what
areas of organizational expertise the institutions had and what specific roles they could adopt to address
the needs of local people. To analyze these interviews, we applied qualitative descriptive analysis—an
approach that uses interview data to make meaning of the world to improve our understanding of
social phenomena [38]. In doing descriptive analysis, the researcher (a) identifies a phenomenon from
the research questions such as possible gaps/challenges of participation; (b) finds the main constructs
in interview responses, i.e., institutional roles and goals of interest in development; (c) measures
the constructs intuitively by selecting quotations that could be meaningfully applied to address the
concerns of local people. Below is an illustration of the institutions and experts interviewed (Table 2).
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Table 2. Study institutions. Authors’ field data (2017).
Subdivisional Councils State Organs NGOs
Regional
Division Expert Organ Expert Organization Expert
Buea Deputy sta
Programme Nationale
pour le Developpement
Participatif (PNDP)
Senior Sta
Gesellschaft für
Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
project unit
Project leader
Limbe II Senior sta
Ministère des Forêts et de
la Faune (MINFOF)
regional delegation
Senior Sta
Environment and
Rural Development
Foundation (ERUDEF)
Development
Expert
Mbonge Deputy sta
Ministère de l’Economie,
de la Planification et de
l’Aménagement du
Territoire (MINEPAT)
Service sta WWF local unit Educator
Muyuka Deputy sta
South West
Development
Authority (SOWEDA)
Technical sta
Mount Cameroon
Ecotourism
Organization (Mt.
CEO)
Senior sta
Idenau Deputy sta Limbe Wildlife Centre(LWC) Senior sta
Limbe Botanical and
Zoological Garden Absent
MCNP Service Sta assistant
The second method involved semistructured focus groups—a method that explores individual
participants’ views on dierent topics [39]. Together with MCNP ocials and village chiefs, we opted
for a purposive sample of 17 villages around MCNP. The villages have livelihoods connected to MCNP
both directly and indirectly and are located less than 12 km from the park boundary. The aim was to
include several villages that are part of the co-management system and that have livelihoods related
to MCNP. In all of them, village chiefs selected participants for each of the focus groups (Table 3).
Chiefs are in a better position to gather participants they know would represent their communities
during meetings. The focus group meetings were comprised of persons from various walks of life
including hunters, farmers, fishermen, and traders, who are members of various village committees
and traditional councils (Figure 2).
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Table 3. Focus groups in the study. Authors’ field data (2017).
MCNP Cluster
Zone Study Village
Focus Group
No.
No. of
Participants Age Group Male: Female
Buea Bonakanda 1 16 16–60+ 13:3
West Coast
Lower Boando 2 16 16–60+ 12:4
Batoke 3 16 26–60+ 9:7
Bakingili 4 16 26–60+ 11:5
Njonje 5 16 26–60 9:7
Bibunde 6 14 26–60 12:2
Sanje 7 16 16–60+ 15:1
Muyuka
Lykoko 8 16 26–60+ 12:4
Munyenge 9 16 16–60+ 12:4
Bomboko
Bomana 10 16 26–60+ 14:2
Big Koto I 11 16 26–60 13:3
Efolofo 12 16 26–60 14:2
Kuke Kumbo 13 16 26–60 15:1
Munyange 14 16 26–60+ 16:0
Mundongo 15 16 16–60+ 15:1
Bova Bomboko 16 16 16–56 14:2
Boviongo 17 16 26–60+ 13:3
During meetings, cluster facilitators (CFs), who are park ocials and mediators between village
inhabitants and outsiders, acted as translators. In the villages considered in the study, the locals have
dierences of opinion about the task of CFs, which also depends on what kind of problems they have
in their communities. However, it was important for us to have their assistance in translating the views
of locals, mostly from the Mokpwe language. We considered these facilitators as guides that could be
consulted on technical issues when organizing meetings. The lead author moderated the meetings,
and a research assistant took notes and voice recordings of conversations. The duration of the meetings
was on average 2 h. After obtaining informed consent, we used open-ended questions focusing on
local opinions about how co-management aects the everyday life of village inhabitants and those
needs the locals see as essential for development and wellbeing in their communities.
To analyze the data, we used the nominal group technique (NGT). NGT involves a ranking process
of weighing an item against others and ordering the items on a scale according to the importance or
priority [40]. In community research, NGT enables the research to identify elements that are of value to
a community. In this study, the aim was to allow participants in focus groups to list those development
needs they considered important for the wellbeing of people in their communities. In doing so,
the researcher moderates the NGT following a sequence of tasks. (a) Familiarizing participants on the
subject of co-management and its role in fostering community participation. The researcher then invites
participants to express their thoughts about the participatory system. (b) The researcher discusses ideas
raised in the groups and asks individuals to list those needs of development that have to be addressed
in the co-management system on a piece of paper. (c) Rank ordering the needs by determining the
most listed elements in a focus group. This requires identifying those listed development needs with
the highest score for each focus group (Table 4). The ‘number of counts’ below is based on how many
individuals in a focus group listed a corresponding need as being of interest to his/her community.
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Table 4. Prioritizing development needs through NGT. Authors’ field data (2017).
Study Village Focus Group No. No. ofParticipants Community Needs No. of Counts
Bonakanda 1 16 Youth employment andcommunity halls 13
Lower Boando 2 16 Farm equipment andworkshop 10
Batoke 3 16 Youth employment 12
Bakingili 4 16 Water supply 8
Njonje 5 16 Funding to fishermen andrespecting farm boundary 9
Bibunde 6 14 Modifying farm-to-parkboundary 8
Sanje 7 16 Finding assistance tofishermen 10
Lykoko 8 16 Distancing park boundaryfrom farmland 11
Munyenge 9 16 Water supply 8
Bomana 10 16
Sensitization on conservation,
supply farm equipment, and
training new techniques for
crop cultivation
10
Big Koto I 11 16 Supply water, electricity, andtelecommunication networks 9
Efolofo 12 16 Electricity and water supply 7
Kuke Kumbo 13 16 Health center, water supply,and farm tools 11
Munyange 14 16 Youth employment and healthcare 16
Mundongo 15 16 Water supply andtelecommunication networks 13
Bova Bomboko 16 16
Health center, water supply,
and
improve farm-market roads
11
Boviongo 17 16 Water supply 14
4. Results
The previous parts of this paper reviewed the legalities of participation between communities and
institutions around MCNP. We also highlighted the contradictory provisions of co-management and
the methods for data collection and analysis. In this section, we present, on the one hand, the concerns
raised by participants in the focus groups, and, on the other hand, the views of institutional experts
about their role in participatory development.
4.1. Local Concerns about Participation
We identified three main concerns in the focus groups. First, in principle, co-management should
necessitate the fair inclusion of local people in decisions that involve local livelihoods and the natural
environment. However, in the case of MCNP, focus group discussions indicated that the system of
participation had many initial promises for development that have been delayed for years without any
sign of implementation. To highlight two examples, a local stated:
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“The park people are slow in acting. I have not seen anything that I would class as
development in our community as far as the park is concerned. Not all activities promised
by the park authorities have been fulfilled. We get very little help and what we do get
cannot fully support village projects. A good number of locals still do not understand the
conservation development agreement between the park and the community.” (Field data,
2017)
Another individual explained:
“I am not happy because the main problem for us, locals, is the lack of drinkable water and
sucient water for our farms. At the beginning of the co-management, the authorities ran
the projects well, but they have not seen things through properly. They keep on postponing
their plans to act. This is why I am not pleased with the participation system. More is still
expected from the park ocials.” (Field data, 2017)
The above examples illustrate what we think is a paradox of participating in co-management.
In situations of local concern about unfulfilled promises, many of the participants requested the state
authorities to issue development incentives that can serve as a reciprocal obligation for locals to ensure
their compliance with state forestry law. The locals suggest receiving such assistance, which will not
only help to boost the wellbeing of people but will also enable them to help the regime by reporting
unsustainable practices like poaching and encroachment on MCNP.
Second, in spite of state eorts to encourage growth in the production of cocoa and other food
crops in villages, there were diculties when it came to transporting farm produce to the market.
The locals attributed this situation to poor, narrow, and stony road conditions, as well as a lack of
electricity, which made communication dicult between buyers and sellers. Consider the thoughts of
a farmer in Boviongo:
“The remoteness of the village makes it hard for farmers to transport cocoa to the market.
At times, the farmers have to wait and hope for traders to arrive from far away, which
is usually dicult. I am hoping that the government could support the community by
maintaining the road conditions. Some of the budget for roads could be used to employ
youths who do not have jobs, so as they could assist in renovating the roads for farmers and
traders.” (Field data, 2017)
Furthermore, participants noted that such state attempts to enhance yields in farm crops required
issuing farm equipment and learning new methods of crop cultivation. Participants from other villages
had the same view (Table 4). On a similar note, the locals complained that park ocials had extended
the protected area boundary into village farmland, as specified in the words of another participant:
“I am aware that the locals need to help protect wildlife in the park, but it is also important
for park ocials to respect our farmland that is located close to the park boundary. Despite
the support we gave to ocials in the past, they take our farms without any dialogue.” (Field
data, 2017)
Third, sensitization was a fundamental concern mentioned during focus group meetings. In this
example, sensitization aims at creating awareness among locals on several topics, such as how
to adopt sustainable practices for biodiversity conservation in MCNP, methods for getting higher
crop yields, and ideas about the exchange of information on development activities. In this example,
participants felt that management ocials had not entirely educated them on the content of conservation
development agreements (CDC) and laws adopted in co-management. Some respondents perceived
forest management committees as having little information for them. Even so, some participants
did not have adequate knowledge about the endangered species of animals and plants in MCNP.
In Munyenge, for instance, a local stated:
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“The population has increased over the years. People cut down trees and do not know which
trees the forestry law protects. Some of the locals have trees on their farmland but are told
not to cut them down without consulting with park management authorities. The laws are
outdated and need to be revised to help the locals know what to do in promoting biodiversity
conservation.” (Field data, 2017)
Group participants also explained that some management ocials collected data from them
without giving details of how they would use the information, and did not report back on the results.
The lack of accountability and transparency in participation poses a further problem in this system of
management. If such information was properly communicated to locals, respondents would most
likely not complain about the need for sensitization.
It is, however, worth noting that, in spite of these concerns among locals, some focus groups did
embrace the current system of participation. For example, in focus groups 9, 10, 13, and 15 (Table 4),
participants acknowledged the benefits of the training workshops that enabled them to generate
income for their families. Furthermore, they indicated that the cassava machines supplied by the
MCNP Service helped to produce an edible product, garri (cassava, crushed into grains and fried),
that was of high demand in local markets. As such, the locals indicated that an increase in the supply
of machines would enable them to expand their production of garri. This is a good example of how the
local community embraced development ideas determined by the authorities, which can be adapted
for meeting other development needs (Table 4).
4.2. Institutional Knowledge, Expertise, and Capacity for Action
To identify institutional knowledge and expertise, we need to understand the views of ocials
whose day-to-day activities are related to collaboration with local communities (Table 2). In the
case of the five subdivisional councils in the southwest region of Cameroon, the interviews showed
that councils had counsellors—individuals stationed in villages, with the responsibility of acting as
intermediaries between council sta and village inhabitants. They do so by reporting to councils
on matters aecting local communities, and in return, communicating feedback from councils to the
local community. In practice, subdivisional councils, ratified by decentralization state laws, have the
responsibility to examine local needs and request financial assistance from PNDP and external bodies.
An ocial in the Mbonge Council had this thought about his institution’s role:
“In the past, most activities done in cooperation with local communities were centralized.
It is only in recent years that we are beginning to have the decentralization laws implemented.
Our institutional role of working with locals is still very new. One of our goals is to explore
ways of transforming natural resources into avenues of development to serve the communities.
The laws are, however, clear and our council tries to comply with them. The council aims
at having a common understanding with the locals, making them know the limits of using
the forest traditionally. Be it harvesting timber and hunting animals for their cultural needs,
we need to ensure that the locals can sustain biodiversity. The council’s tasks are at times
limited by a lack of finances. There are many financial constraints against achieving some of
its goals. The council intends to collaborate more with various conservation agencies and
local communities to develop MCNP resources in ways that can improve the Bomboko road
and the wellbeing of people living around MCNP.” (Field data, 2017)
Another ocial from Idenau Council added:
“The villages in the Idenau area have a memorandum of understanding with the MCNP
Service and its partners. Since the creation of the park, the locals signed several documents
and deposited them at the council. The council, therefore, engages in every activity to do
with the locals and the park authorities. One area of interest for us is collaborating with forest
management committees, through which we help the locals to understand what animals and
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trees can be preserved. I must admit that the coming of the park has altered the traditions of
the people. There are heritage sites in the park that the locals once freely visited to perform
their rituals. Nowadays, the locals have to obtain permission from the park authorities before
entry. The council also aims at encouraging the locals on how they can make use of nontimber
forest products to generate income. As the park is here to stay, there is an obligation to train
the locals in skills they can adopt to be self-reliant, such as the management of beehives and
providing social amenities for the communities.” (Field data, 2017)
In the above examples, though subdivisional councils have a legal responsibility to facilitate
community development, their capacity to act in the co-management system a requires familiarizing
themselves with new challenges. In particular, they must find ways to balance the biodiversity
conservation needs of the park and the local needs of communities.
Interviews showed that organs of the state were crucial to ease the decentralization process.
For instance, an ocial at MINEPAT explained that:
“The communities around Mount Cameroon now have a protected area. There is a need for
regulated approaches to forest exploitation. The lawmakers must take into account the plight
of local people so they do not feel left out. MINEPAT comes in at this level to coordinate
stakeholders in the southwest region. The aim is to develop a common mapping platform
tool in the next five years, to facilitate access to information between villages and agencies in
the field. This will make it easier for various actors to understand development needs and act
from a common standpoint where everyone is included in decision-making. Both the village
chiefs and council mayors have an important role to play in this process.” (Field data, 2017)
At PNDP, an ocial made this appraisal:
“PNDP operates in several sectors involving agriculture, water, mining, administration,
and security. One of our aims is helping regional councils realize their community
development plans. Through the councils, PNDP can identify what needs the villages have
and what represents a priority project for financing. Upon approval of such plans, PNDP
directly participates in villages by conducting feasibility studies, designing microprojects,
and disbursing funds to help councils realize these projects.” (Field data, 2017)
Ocials at MINFOF and the MCNP Service shared similar views in interviews. The MCNP
Service, for instance, plays a central role in managing issues of forestry and wildlife between MCNP and
adjacent villages. It does so in collaboration with councils and partner NGOs. However, the interviews
suggest that the capacity for such a partnership to be eective in the co-management system significantly
depends on mechanisms for communication such as a memorandum of understanding and partnership
agreements. Both mechanisms also require technical, financial, and moral support. Without these
essentials for participation, it becomes hard to achieve certain projects in villages.
In the examples of SOWEDA and LWC, ocials talked about their expertise in fostering capacity
building in communities. For example, when collaborating with people living in the Mount Cameroon
area, SOWEDA is consulted to facilitate agricultural development and issue seedlings and tools, while
remaining conscious of the impact that agriculture has on forestland. They acknowledged, however,
that the coming of protected areas and conservation laws obliges their institution to find alternative
means of livelihood for local people, which, again, depends on the availability of finances in the system
of participation.
Concerning the role of NGOs in the co-management system, the interviews demonstrate the
eorts made by ocials to draw locals into practices of conservation and development. For instance,
in the words of a GIZ ocial:
“As far as co-management is concerned, the local people are part and parcel of the
decision-making process. In the past, we have had foreign agencies visiting with
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pre-conceived ideas, which the locals often find hard to understand. Our focus has been to
understand local perceptions about the use of natural resources and what interests they have
in the park. A diculty is that many of the locals still believe biodiversity will be available
forever without depletion. Our organization helps to ensure that the locals can continue to
rely on certain plants in the forest for traditional healing. We are exploring ways to promote
local participation in the sustainable use of forest through the option of access cards that will
enable local people to use the park in a controlled manner.” (Field data, 2017)
On another note, NGOs exert both moral and technical support in participation. An interviewee
at Mt. CEO talked about its role in the promotion of ecotourism—an activity that often requires
the employment of local people who are very familiar with the land. Meanwhile, a WWF local unit
assists MCNP ocials with the equipment, skills, and information necessary for wildlife protection.
An interview with a WWF ocial showed that, apart from technical interest, the organization works in
collaboration with local communities. It does so through sensitization programs to promote knowledge
of biodiversity conservation. Consider this comment from one ocial:
“One diculty with preserving the biodiversity of MCNP comes from poaching activities.
It is, therefore, an important goal of our capacity-building unit to train and educate locals
on wildlife conservation, to reduce the frequent occurrence of illegal activities in protected
areas. There is the saying that ‘you can sell an elephant a thousand times when you use a
camera and not a bullet.’ One of our future priorities is to develop new educational courses
on biodiversity conservation, targeting the basic educational sector in the southwest region.”
(Field data, 2017)
5. Discussion
We have identified the paradox of co-management, which is an unrepresented local input in the
system. Furthermore, in elaborating on the fieldwork results, we identified observations, stressing
on the one hand the concerns of local people, and on the other hand the role of small institutions.
In previous studies, critiques of participation [3,12–14,16,18,19] examined the undesirable outcomes of
state-led participatory systems without much analysis of how institutional knowledge could better
acknowledge the development needs of local people in co-management. To bridge this gap, the results
of our study suggest three factors for advancing the existing literature on the critique of participation.
First, as to the legal basis for participation between institutions and local people, there are
opportunities we can exploit for improving co-management despite its paradoxes. Previous studies
have shown that the dominant model of centrally driven participation compromises the eectiveness
of conservation projects [12,14,19]. In such modeling, capitalist elites tend to remake biodiversity
landscapes for capital accumulation [13]. Even so, in spite of decentralizing power, shady practices do
exist that lead to the inecient performance of institutions [17]. While we agree with these assertions,
our study suggests that legislation for participation should have pragmatic provisions that can be
customized to enhance community involvement. Examples of such laws include Cameroon’s 2004
decentralization law that formalized the role of subdivisional councils in supporting local communities,
Cameroon’s 1996 decentralization law on freedom of association that permits NGOs to have a hand
in environmental protection, and the 1994 state forestry law for the inclusion of indigenous people
in forestry. The pragmatism of these laws indicates that placing local knowledge that arises from
the human-environment relationship at the core of participation will avoid politicizing or imposing
development on locals. This type of knowledge would include the convictions by which local people
have lived; as partners with the environment, they have been using it traditionally for much longer
than MCNP has existed. That is why respecting the opinions of local people has great potential for
ensuring eective participation.
Second, regarding the paradox of co-management and the concerns of local people, the results
revealed that many respondents in the focus groups had little awareness of forestry laws and the
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regulations for biodiversity conservation. They knew little about the results of data collected from
villages and the content of conservation development agreements (CDA). Consistent with these
findings, the existing literature has assessed the mixed success of the NGO sector in engaging with
participatory methodologies [3]. Previous studies have proposed that, despite inequalities in such
sectors, enhancing the political rights of marginalized groups in participatory development can help
provide the transformative change needed in wider power structures. Furthermore, [16] called for
a reconsideration of development practitioner roles in implementing participation among people.
The case of MCNP, however, suggests that such practitioner roles in the hands of institutions, as well as
the political rights that local people need in participation, could be amended through accountable and
transparent forms of communication. That is, participation should be based on a two-way, open system
of information exchange wherein locals can question institutional assistance, and institutions must
justify their actions.
Third, in acknowledging the development needs of local people, MCNP showed that smaller
institutions aiming to promote biodiversity conservation have diculties with providing alternative
livelihoods for locals. Similar issues have been addressed in studies about broader governance
structures that do not always lead to local empowerment and control [18]. Nevertheless, our inquiry
on the subdivisional level of governance revealed the willingness of institutions to engage in dialogue
about the local use of forests in making decisions for preserving biodiversity. What we recommend,
therefore, is that such eagerness for dialogue between locals and smaller institutions be utilized to
create what [6] call adaptive social-ecological systems. In these systems, institutions cooperate with
locals to come to decisions about community projects and provide locals with first-hand information
about how they intend to promote local knowledge of the environment. Such knowledge, being
a conflation of ideas, should culturally and ecologically link to real-life practices recognizable by
dierences between the needs of locals who live in remote villages and those living closer to urban
areas. These are dierent experiences of the use of the natural environment that institutions need to
take into consideration to meet development needs.
6. Conclusions
This study deliberated on the role of institutions that nest in contradictory spaces of participation
between local people and co-management regimes. For a historical understanding of this relationship,
we reviewed the literature on structural adjustments in Cameroon and its influence on acculturating local
communities into neoliberal ideas and inequalities of participatory development. Using the example
of a co-management system for MCNP and adjacent communities, we explored how mechanisms
of participation are governed by state regulations that accommodate local inclusion in structures to
execute predetermined actions of the regime. In this study, we acknowledged the inequitable sharing
of power among actors and the development needs/concerns that local people have. Our results show
that several neoliberal exercises around MCNP are steered by subdivisional councils, state organs,
and NGOs to assists communities with development projects legalized by state regulations. Here,
the presence of strict laws to preserve protected areas makes the need for alternative sources of income
important for village inhabitants. This is why local people increasingly internalize the aims, principles,
and values of development, basing their priority needs on the neoliberal agenda of institutions.
Previous studies related to institutional knowledge in participatory systems [3,12–14,16,18,19]
have accorded this unfavorable outcome to systems that determine participation with little influence
from locals. However, there has been little exploration of how institutional knowledge at local levels of
society could facilitate local needs in these undesirable systems of participation. Our analysis indicates
that, in this situation, although co-management does not entirely favor all actors, the pragmatic basis
of institutional knowledge provides avenues by which we can improve community participation.
An eective method would be the joint management of tasks between institutions and local people
without autocratic influence. This will help enhance the eciency of putting into practice policies and
laws for participation.
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Furthermore, not many locals had full knowledge about the use of information gathered from
them by the regime in spite of the village forest management committees (VFMCs) set up for discussion
between locals and park ocials. Accountable and transparent communication between communities
and institutions should ensure that local people have full knowledge about the use of information
gathered from them. Some ocials expressed their lack of knowledge about the traditional context
for using and maintaining biodiversity in protected areas. This hinders the adaptive capacity that
institutions target for social-ecological systems. Open dialogue, collective action, and the exchange
of first-hand information between institutions and local communities in decisions about community
projects will help develop new insights as to how traditional knowledge can be integrated into the
proper management of protected areas. While these suggestions may be hard to achieve in the current
system of co-management, institutional knowledge remains an important tool with which we can
explore options for augmenting community participation.
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